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Gender Diverse Portfolios as New Asset Class
Abstract
This paper studies market-traded equity portfolios that are constructed based on a min-
imum number of female board members and/or a target female work force ratio. Using
the top 1,000 US firms from 2002 to 2015 as the tradable asset universe, we replicate
and backtest five gender diverse portfolios. We find that these portfolios have smaller
idiosyncratic risks and that their constituent firms have better CSR (Corporate Social
Responsibility) rating. Consistent with previous research findings on CSR stocks, these
gender diverse portfolios also have a smaller downside risk. From the portfolio’s risk-
return performance and their social policy implication, we argue that that these gender
diverse portfolios constitute a new asset class.
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Gender Diverse Portfolios as New Asset Class
INTRODUCTION
Gender diversity is a key policy hotly debated around the world. Numerous government
legislation has been introduced to encourage firms to improve board gender diversity
and to increase the female work force. Board gender diversity is typically promoted
through “equality of opportunity” or through “equality of outcome” (Watson, 1995).
Belgium, France, Germany,1 Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Norway2 and Spain currently
have legislated quotas for women on corporate boards of publicly listed companies (World
Bank Group, 2015); this is an example of “equality of outcome”. For the latter, fifteen
countries, including the UK, have included in their corporate governance codes requiring
companies to “comply or explain” gender diversity board composition (Terjesen et al.,
2015). While gender diversity is improving over the years, gender equality is still a distant
goal. According to the European Commission, the average female board ratio for the
largest publicly listed firms among the 28 EU Member States was merely 18.6% in 2014.
Outside the European union, female board ratio is much lower. Figure 1 presents female
board ratio from BoardEx as of April 2015 in four region/country groups: EU, UK, US
and the rest of the world (RoW), and further divided into ten sectors. Not surprisingly,
EU with its strong legislation has the highest average female board ratio across all sectors
(from 18% for “Materials” to 23% for “Consumer Staples”).3 In contrast, RoW has the
lowest female board ratio at around 10% across all sectors. Female board ratio is higher in
“utility” and “consumer”, but lower in “Energy”, “Materials”, and “Telecommunication
Services”. It is important to note that the highest female board ratio for any sector and
in any region is less than 25%, indicating that the corporate boardrooms around the
world are very much dominated by men.
1Germany made it compulsory from 2015 for large firms to commit to at least 30% of non-
executive female members on the board of directors. See https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/mar/
06/germany-gender-quota-legislation-boardroom-law-women.
2Since 2003, Norwegian firms are required to have at least 40% representation at the board level
for each gender. See Bertrand et al. (2014) for comprehensive analyses on this legislative impact on
Norwegian firms.
3Some information about global legislation on board diversity can be found on Harvard Law School
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Gender Parity on Boards Around the World,
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/05/gender-parity-on-boards-around-the-world/).
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Apart from the social debate, some questioned the value added that female leader-
ship brought to the boardroom. Research findings to date are inconclusive, implying
that board gender diversity does not lead to superior/worse firm performance, or add
to/destroy shareholder value.4 Bohren and Strom (2010) find that gender diversity im-
proves corporate financial performance among the listed companies in Oslo Stock Ex-
change (OSE) in Norway. Dezso¨ and Ross (2012) examine constituent firms in S&P 1500
index and find that female managers bring informational and social diversity benefits to
corporate performance (e.g. Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE), if the firm also has a high pro-
portion of R&D expenses (scaled by the value of total assets). Garcia-Meca et al. (2015)
document a positive gender impact on firm’s performance in the banking sector. Kang
et al. (2010) find positive abnormal stock returns in Singapore on the announcement of
appointment of women directors who assume independent board positions but not for the
appointment of women CEOs. Lyngsie and Foss (2017) study firm’s self-reported counts
of new business opportunities in Denmark. They find a connection between successfully
launched business and the proportion of female in the top management team. They argue
that gender diversity in top management promotes “thinking out-of-box”. But Adams
and Ferreira (2009) find that board gender diversity decreases corporate value of US
firms. Carter et al. (2010) find that gender diversity does not have a significant impact
on corporate performance among the constituents of the S&P 500 index. Chapple and
Humphrey (2014) report no relationship between gender diversity and Australian firm
return. Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) study FTSE firms but find no relationship between
the proportion of female directors and the firm’s ROA or ROE. Sila et al. (2016) find
gender diversity does not affect board’s risk-taking, but the firm’s risk-taking affects the
choice of director’s gender. Finally, Abdullah et al. (2016) examine board gender equality
and corporate performance in Malaysia, but find mixed results; a positive relationship
for ROA and a negative relationship for Tobin’s Q. They attribute this mixed effect to
different performance indicators, firm ownership, and board’s structure.
Notwithstanding the equivocal empirical evidence in the literature, a number of gender
diverse portfolios have been launched in recent years. The exchange-traded fund (ETF
ticker: SHE) based on SSGA (State Street Global Advisors) Gender Diversity Index was
4See Adams et al. (2015) editorial note.
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launched in 2016,5 while Barclay’s Women in Leadership (ETN ticker: WIL) was launched
earlier in 2014. The success of these market-traded gender diverse equity portfolios could
potentially trigger a second wave of social change even without any new legislation: if
more investment is drawn to these portfolios, more mutual funds and ETF will increase
their investment in gender diverse firms, and more firms will become more gender diverse
just to join the bandwagon or to make themselves more attractive for portfolio selection.
As most of these gender diverse equity portfolios are launched in recent years, to the best
of our knowledge, no study has conducted any analyses or backtests on these portfolios.
The lack of research efforts reflects the difficulty in tracing appointment history at board
and senior management levels. Our research fills this gap in the literature by providing a
detailed analysis of the portfolio risk-return profile and by characterizing the constituent
firms included in these portfolios. Our research findings will facilitate informed investment
decisions.
To achieve aforementioned goals, in this paper, we focus on the most liquid and trad-
able US stocks typically chosen as constituents of these market traded gender diverse
portfolios. We study, in particular, SSGA’s SHE, Barclay’s WIL, MSCI’s Women on
Board Index (WOB), Morgan Stanley’s Parity Portfolio (MSParity), and a portfolio that
conforms to a US campaign, 2020 Women on Board (US2020, hereafter).6 Using board
member and senior manager information in BoardEx, we create mimic portfolios for each
of these gender diverse portfolios and backtest their risk-return performance from 2002.
By reversing the asset selection criteria of SHE, we created HE as SHE’s counterpart
(with zero to 5% female board ratio) in order to compare portfolio performance from the
two ends of the gender diversity spectrum. We apply Carhart four factor model to test
for portfolio alphas. We do not find any significant abnormal return for all portfolios.
This finding is consistent with Chapple and Humphrey (2014) and is in line with the fact
that the US stock market is efficient. However, we do find portfolio idiosyncratic risk is
smaller for all gender diverse portfolios than HE. Moreover, we find this “idiosyncratic
risk vs. female board ratio” relationship has a U-shape pattern, suggesting that there is
an optimal level of female board ratio which translates to three female board members
in a typical board size of 10 members.
5See article in Business Wire (http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160307005890/en/
State-Street-Global-Advisors-Launches-Gender-Diversity) for detail.
6See Sonnabend (2015) for more detail.
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How is board gender diversity linked to a smaller stock idiosyncratic risk? Some
of the previous studies may have provided possible explanations. Adams and Ferreira
(2009), among others, argue that female board members are more likely to join monitoring
committees; therefore, a more gender diverse board tends to lower business risk. In this
paper, we test the relationship between board gender diversity and stock idiosyncratic
risk through firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. We use firm’s
CSR score obtained from MSCI KLD ESG database as instrumental variables for female
board ratio after controlling for firm characteristics. We find that these CSR instrumental
variables for female board ratios have a negative relationship with firm’s idiosyncratic risk.
Our findings confirm that connection between gender diverse board and firm’s reduced
idiosyncratic risk is through the “Corporate Social Responsibility” channel. There is
established literature claiming that some investors invest in firms that are more socially
responsible, because these firms provide “insurance-like” benefits (Godfrey, 2005; Godfrey
et al., 2009; Koh et al., 2014).7 Our paper contributes to this thread of literature by
linking women board representation and corporate social responsibility, and by providing
evidence that this link extends to a reduced idiosyncratic risk for stocks. In the last
part of our analyses, we conduct robustness test if board gender diversity indeed has an
impact on firm’s CSR performance. We provide evidence that board gender diversity
improves corporate social responsibility, and there is no reverse causality. When we
further investigate the sub-components of the CSR score, we find that gender diverse
board helps to reduce concerns among “Diversity” and “Governance” aspects of CSR.
These results extend the findings in Adams and Ferreira (2009), and are consistent with
findings in Marquis and Lee (2013) that female board members contribute to corporate
philanthropy.
DATA
This section details the data sample used in this paper and the formation of our gender
diverse equity portfolios. Since the main objective of this paper is to backtest market-
traded equity portfolios, stock investability and liquidity are important considerations
7Godfrey et al. (2009) studies 160 US firms over the sample period from 1991 to 2002 and find better
CSR firms’ CAR suffered less during negative impact events (e.g. legal/regulatory actions arising from
health/safety violations as reported in the Wall Street Journal).
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for our choice of the stock sample universe. Hence, we use firm size as a proxy for
investability. We choose not to use stock trading volume because stock trading volume
can be volatile and very sensitive to negative news (Brennan et al., 2013). In contrast
to stock trading volume, firm size, represented by firm’s market capitalization, is more
stable. In addition, large firms are more likely to be investment targets, especially for
institutional investors.
We use Datastream and Compustat to identify top 1,000 US firms with the largest
market capitalization value. The selection is repeated each year and therefore we have
14,000 firm-year observations with 1,951 unique firms over the 14-year period from 2002
to 2015.8 We follow as close as possible the firm selection rules documented in SSGA’s
description of their Gender Diversity Index, the underlying index of their SHE ETF.9
The same 1,951 firm universe is used to form all other gender diverse portfolios to aid
comparisons. All our gender diverse portfolios are value-weighted portfolios.
For the 1,951 firms in our stock universe, we collate the board executive and senior
manager information from BoardEx, and corporate social responsibility information from
MSCI KLD ESG databases. Unfortunately, BoardEx does not provide board information
for some listed firms. Therefore, for any company that cannot be traced in BoardEx, we
replace it with another firm that has the next highest market capitalization value, making
sure that we have 1,000 firms in each year. In total, 33 firms were replaced due to no
record in BoardEx, with an average of 6 missing firms per year (with the minimum of
one unmatched firm in 2015, and a maximum of 10 unmatched firms in 2002). Over the
14-year period from 2012 to 2015, there are 33,593 senior managers, and 14,761 directors
in our sample.10
Next, we detail how each gender diverse portfolio is constructed.
SHE and “HE”: According to State Street Global Advisors (SSGA), the SHE ETF,
8Following SSGA’s SHE, the portfolio’s rebalanced dates are on 15th July of each year, except for
2015 when the rebalanced date is on 15th April as our BoardEx historical data terminates on 24th April,
2015.
9The selection rules are detailed in https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/
general-investing/2016/SSGA-Gender-Diversity-Index-Methodology.pdf
10For the 1,951 firms selected, 392 firms have missing appointment dates at board level, and 1,155
firms have missing appointment dates at senior management level. As some of the firms have missing
appointment dates for both board members and senior management, the total number of firms with some
missing appointment information is less than the sum of 392 and 1,155. The individuals with missing
appointment dates (about 0.2% of the population) are omitted in the calculation of female (board) ratio.
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based on its Gender Diversity Index, is designed to track the performance of US large-
capitalization firms that are leaders within their respective industry sectors in advancing
women through gender diversity on their boards of directors and in senior leadership
positions. A stock is selected if it is among the highest ranked in its sector in terms
of female ratio among senior managers, directors, or executives, and that the firm has a
female CEO, or a female chairperson, or at least one female board member.11 The highest
ranking stocks, within each sector, are selected till the total market capitalization of the
selected stocks reaches the 10% market capitalization of that sector.12 For comparison,
we created HE equity portfolio by choosing the firms with the lowest female ratio within
each sector till the total market capitalization of the selected stocks reaches the 10%
market capitalization of that sector.
MSParity: Morgan Stanley Parity Portfolio (MSParity) focuses specifically on in-
creasing female board representation with the minimum of three female directors. The
portfolio selection criteria also include several quantitative indicators such as free cash
flow, profitability, and valuation, and some qualitative indicators such as business model
and adaptability, management strength, and innovation strength. Unfortunately, we do
not have access to the details of these indicators; hence, we simply use a minimum of
three female directors to form our synthetic MSParity portfolio.
WIL: Barclay’s Women in Leadership (WIL) is a debt-related ETN (Exchange Traded
Note) that tracks a portfolio of firms with a female CEO or with women making up at
least one-fourth of the board of directors. To be included in the portfolio, a firm must
meet specific market capitalization and trading volume thresholds. Our goal here is not
to value the ETN but to track the index portfolio. To mimic WIL, we select a firm if
it has a female CEO, or it has more than 25% of female representation on the board of
directors.
WOB: To be included in MSCI’s Women on Board (WOB), a firm must satisfy all
three criteria: (i) At least three female board members or two female board members if one
of them is in a current leadership role (e.g., CEO, co-CEO, Chair, Co-Chair, Executive
11Here, CEO includes also deputy CEO, co-CEO, but excludes division CEO and regional CEO.
Chairperson includes also vice chairperson, deputy chairperson, but excludes committee chairperson.
12The sector information is extracted from Compustat. The Compustat industry classification is
identical to GISC except that it lists real estate firms separately. To be consistent with GISC, we group
’Real Estate’ as part of ’Financial’.
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Chair, Lead Director, or CFO); (ii) Percentage of women on board must exceed the
national average or 50%; and (iii) Excludes firms facing Severe and Very Severe “Labor
Rights – Discrimination and Workforce Diversity” Controversy Scores. For simplicity, we
create our version of WOB using criterion (i) above, and (ii) the percentage of women on
board must exceed the sample average on the portfolio’s annual re-balance date.
US2020: According to Sonnabend (2015), the “2020 Women on Boards” campaign
advocates a minimum of 20% of women on corporate boards. To form our US2020
portfolio, we include all firms with 20% or higher female board ratio.
Table 1 reports the board diversity statistics for all five gender diverse portfolios and
HE. The average board size is more than 9 board members, and the average number of
female board members is just 1.19 (or 12%) over the sample period from 2002 to 2015.
When we look at the board statistics across all portfolios, we do not find huge differences
in board size. For all gender diverse portfolios, the average female board size is between
10 and 12 board members, while the average board size for HE, the male dominated
counterpart, is slightly smaller (9 members). In contrast, there is a clear difference in
female board representation between HE and the other five gender-diverse portfolios. The
average number of female board members is about 3 (or 30%) across all gender diverse
portfolios, but less than 1 (or 2%) for HE.
Figure 2 plots the female board ratio for SHE and HE. It is clear that SHE has a much
higher female board ratio than HE throughout the sample period. Interestingly, both
portfolios have increasing female board ratios over time, but SHE (32.15% − 25.18% =
6.97%) has a higher level of increase than HE (4.42%− 1.6% = 2.82%).
We match our 1,951 firms with their CSR scores obtained from the MSCI KLD ESG
database. The ESG scores in KLD are provided in seven main categories: Environment
(ENV), Community (COM), Human Rights (HUM), Employee Relationship (EMP), Di-
versity (DIV), Product (PRO), and Corporate Governance (GOV). The combined score
(ALL) is the sum of the category scores. For each category, KLD reports the number of
strengths and concerns separately and its category score is calculated as strengths minus
concerns under each category. Since our objective is to study the relationship between
female board members and their impact on corporate social responsibility, there is a po-
tential endogeneity issue if our KLD ESG score contains board gender diversity as well.
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Hence, we removed the board diversity score from DIV, and recalculate ALL and DIV
accordingly.
KLD ESG score is widely used in studies of corporate social responsibility. Choi and
Wang (2009), Hillman and Keim (2001), and Mattingly and Berman (2006) use the aggre-
gate CSR score (or ALL in this paper) to study the individual firm’s CSR performance.
Some studies focus on the subset of the category scores from specific aspects of corporate
social responsibility. For example, Bear et al. (2010) study firm’s technology strength
(PRO+GOV+EMP) and institutional strength (COM+DIV). Our paper extends these
studies as we study both category strength and concern separately and also their aggre-
gate.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the KLD ESG strength, concern, and
overall scores for the 1,951 firms over the period from 2002 to 2015. The combined
score is negatively -0.11, due to the average concern measure (2.12) being larger than
the average strength measure (2.02). The overall CSR improved over the two sub-sample
periods. The average strength increased from 1.61 to 2.41 over time, while the average
concern reduced from 2.22 to 2.04.
Table 3 reports the sector average composite scores (ALL), standard deviations and the
number of firm years in each sector. Some sectors such as “Energy” and “Materials” have
comparatively lower CSR scores (-1.34 and -0.81, respectively), while “Consumer Staples”
and “Financials” have the highest scores (0.39 and 0.13, respectively). It is interesting
to note the similar sector pattern with the sector female board ratio presented in Figure
1. The statistics in Table 3 suggest sector difference in CSR performance. Therefore, we
add sector dummies to control for sector fixed effect in subsequent analyses.
HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Portfolio Risk-Return Characteristics
Most of the previous studies have investigated the impact of gender diverse board on
corporate performance in terms of firm’s profitability and business risk. Our first research
objective here is to investigate if investing in market traded gender diverse portfolios
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generates abnormal return to shareholders.13 Using Carhart four-factor model, Chapple
and Humphrey (2014) find that, among S&P-ASX 300 constituents, some sector-based
portfolios such as “Basic Materials” have positive abnormal return, while others such
as “Consumer Services” do not. Compare with Chapple and Humphrey (2014), our
focus is on the risk and returns of market-traded portfolios of stocks with gender diverse
board and senior management. In particular, we also study the portfolio’s idiosyncratic
risk, namely portfolio’s residual volatility after adjusting and controlling for the known
systematic risks that are priced. We formulate our first set of hypotheses as follows:
H1: Investing in gender diversity is beneficial; stock market reacts positively if firms
have gender diverse board and senior management.
We use the portfolios constructed in the previous section (including a male dominated
counterpart created by us) to test if gender diverse portfolios produce higher return and
smaller portfolio risk. Specifically, we test the following two hypotheses:
H1a: Gender diverse portfolios generate higher risk-adjusted returns than HE, and
H1b: Gender diverse portfolios have lower idiosyncratic risks than HE.
We use the Carhart four-factor model to test for abnormal return and to estimate portfolio
idiosyncratic risk. For each portfolio, p, we run a time-series regression by
ExRetp,t = αp + β
MktRf
p (RM,t −Rf,t) + βSMBp SMBt + βHMLp HMLt
+ βMOMp MOMt + εp,t (1)
where ExRetp,t is the monthly portfolio excess return in month t, RM −Rf is the market
risk premium, SMB is small-minus-big or the size premium, HML is high-minus-low or
the growth premium, and MOM is momentum. A positive and statistically significant α
indicates the existence of a superior risk-adjusted return conditioned on the four Carhart
risk factors.14 Portfolio idiosyncratic risk σε,p is defined as the standard deviation of the
residuals εp,t in Equation (1).
To test H1a, we calculate portfolios’ time-series risk-adjusted excess return by αp,t =
13Chapple and Humphrey (2014) strongly argue that such a portfolio approach reduces typical endo-
geneity issue related to test on gender diversity and firm’s performance.
14Monthly Carhart risk factors are obtained via WRDS.
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αp + εp,t, and run paired Student’s t-test on αp,t between portfolios. To test H1b, we use
Chi-square variance test to investigate if εp,t is significantly different between portfolios.
Ang et al. (2006) and Ang et al. (2009) argue that firm’s idiosyncratic volatility is
priced cross-sectionally. They report a significant difference in stock returns of portfolios
sorted by the standard deviations of the residuals from the Fama-French model. Following
these studies, we further explore the volatility-gender relationship at the firm-specific level
for the sample of 1,951 firms. For each year t, we run individual Carhart four-factor model
on the monthly returns on each stock:
ExReti,m = cm + β
MktRf
i,t (RM,m −Rf,m) + βSMBi,t SMBm + βHMLi,t HMLm
+ βMOMi,t MOMm + εi,m, (2)
Then, firm i’s year t idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as IdioV oli,t =
√
12× std(εi,m),
where εi,m is the residual term from Equation (2) in year t. Then, we regress firm’s
IdioV oli,t on lagged board gender diversity proxy using Fama-MacBeth regression below:
IdioV oli,t = c+ α1 × βMktRfi,t + α2 × βSMBi,t + α3 × βHMLi,t + α4 × βMOMi,t
+ α5 × FemaleRatioi,t−1 + ei,t (3)
where β•i,t are the year t beta risk sensitivity obtained from Equation (2), and FemaleRatioi,t−1
is the 1-year lagged female ratio. Here, we use two versions of female ratios: one includes
female board members only, and the other one is calculated based on female board mem-
bers and female senior management.
Furthermore, previous studies report a non-linear relationship between board gender
diversity and corporate performance. First, there is a threshold effect where a critical
mass of three female board members is often quoted; unless the number of female board
members is three or more, the presence of female director(s) alone has no impact on
corporate decision.15 Joecks et al. (2013) describe the critical mass of three as a “magic”
number, when they find a U-shape pattern between the ROE (return on equity) and the
level of corporate gender diversity. Kanter (1977) classifies gender diversity intensity in
15For example, Joecks et al. (2013) and Konrad et al. (2008) study listed German firms and find the
critical mass for women directors is 30% or 20-40% or three women directors; Torchia et al. (2011) study
Norwegian firms and find the critical mass is also three female directors.
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groups: uniform (0%–100%), skewed (dominant group v.s. token group), tilted (minority
v.s. majority group), and balanced group (50%–50%), and argue that the female inter-
action dynamics is very different in each group. Empirically, a tilted supervisory board
sometimes outperforms a skewed supervisory board (Joecks et al., 2013; Torchia et al.,
2011). The female board ratio of our gender diverse portfolios is approximately 30%
or three female board members.16 We conjecture that the non-linear U-shape pattern
will also exhibit in the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and female board ra-
tio. In light of the aforementioned discussion, we include an additional quadratic term
FemaleRatio2t−1 in Equation (3).
Investing Gender Diversity: CSR Channel Hypothesis
In this section, we investigate one potential channel in which corporate gender diversity
might lead to a lower idiosyncratic risk for stock. Some existing studies have already
hinted on how female leaders might have contributed to a reduced corporate business
risk. Adams and Ferreira (2009) note that female directors have better board attendance
records than male directors, and they are more likely to attend and participate in cor-
porate committees dealing with risk management. On the other hand, Sila et al. (2016)
document that firm’s level of risk taking affects the choice of director’s gender, but not
the other way round. Atkinson et al. (2003) find male- and female-managed mutual funds
do not differ significantly in terms of risk taking. Indeed, it is well-known that female
workforce is below men. According to World Bank statistics, the overall women employ-
ment in 2014 is slightly below 40% of the total labor force,17 and even lower at corporate
board level (12%, according to our sample). Therefore, it is often argued that those
women who have already reached the top of the corporate ladder are bolder (i.e. taking
more risk) or tougher than average. Unfortunately, we have no means of assessing the
risk appetite or risk taking behavior of the individual female directors. It is not possible
to investigate here the possible link between a smaller idiosyncratic risk and the female
directors’ personal traits.
At the time of writing, corporate gender diversity is often analyzed with respect to
16See Table 1.
17For women participation in labor market from 1990 to 2014, see http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.FE.ZS.
12
corporate performance and corporate governance instead of under corporate responsibil-
ity and business ethics. In comparison, these have been many studies on CSR (Corporate
Social Responsibility) and SRI (Socially Responsible Investment) that are based on sus-
tainability and ethics. Furthermore, Godfrey (2005), among others, argues that stock
market investors are willing to invest in firms with better CSR records because these
firms provide “insurance like” protection: investors suffer less when CSR firms are in
trouble. Empirically, Bialkowski and Starks (2016) document that flows to self-reported
CSR mutual funds are less sensitive to the funds’ performance than conventional funds,
suggesting that SRI investors are less likely to withdraw immediately when the CSR funds
just begin to perform poorly; profitability is not the sole investment objective for these
SRI investors (Sparkes and Cowton, 2004). In light of these studies, we form our next
hypothesis which we call the CSR Channel hypothesis:
H2: The reason that shareholders of firms included in the gender diverse portfolios are
less sensitive (hence lower IdioV ol) is because these firms are CSR firms.
To test hypothesis H2, we first regress individual firm’s female board ratio on CSR
score and other control variables as follows:
FemaleRatioi,t = c+ β Controli,t + γ CSRi,t + ei,t (4)
where Control is a vector of firm characteristics, and CSR is firm’s corporate social
responsibility score. All variables in Equation (4) are annual data. The control variables
include the logarithmic of market capitalization, board size, ROA, leverage, sales, and
dividend to control for firm characteristics. Board size is the number of directors; ROA
is return on asset calculated as the firm’s net profit divided by total asset; leverage is
calculated as the sum of short- and long-term debts divided by total asset; sales and
dividend are both scaled by total asset. These control variables have been found in
previously studies to be related to board gender diversity; Mart´ın-Ugedo and Minguez-
Vera (2014) find positive relationship between ROA and female board ratio, while Saeed
et al. (2016) find positive relationship between firm size and board gender diversity. For
CSR score, we use two specific KLD ESG scores; the overall score (ALL) and the diversity
score (DIV). Since the KLD diversity score also includes gender diversity, it will bias the
regression result. Hence, we remove board gender diversity score from DIV and ALL, as
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mentioned in DATA section.
Next, we re-run regression (2), but use the fitted values, FemaleRatio∗i,t = c +
β Controli,t + γ CSRi,t, from Equation (4) instead of the actual values:
IdioV oli,t = c+α1 × βMktRfi,t + α2 × βSMBi,t + α3 × βHMLi,t + α4 × βMOMi,t
+α5 × FemaleRatio∗i,t−1 + ei,t (5)
We also include sector and year dummies to control for sector and time effect. Since,
FemaleRatio∗i,t is the portion explained by CSR in Equation (4), this two-step regression
gives an indication on the degree to which the gender-risk relationship is due to our CSR
channel hypothesis.
One can consider the KLD ESG scores used in this two-stage least square (TSLS)
regression as an instrumental variable for female ratio. The benefits of using TSLS are
twofold: to test our CSR channel hypothesis and to address the potential endogeneity
issue in Equation (3), namely women directors might be more risk averse, and firms that
are more risk averse might tend to hire more women. Since we cannot observe female
directors personal traits and firms’ risk appetite, we cannot address this endogeneity issue
directly. We choose to use CSR as a risk attitude independent instrumental variable for
two reasons: (1) CSR is related to female ratio (which we will provide direct evidence
in the next section), and (2) a valid instrumental variable should not be a surrogate for
firm’s (idiosyncratic) risk; there is no theory or empirical evidence to suggest firm’s CSR
score is related to firm’s risk. Firms have clear motivation to improve CSR performance
(Jamali and Mirshak, 2007) and maximize stakeholder’s benefit by maintaining a good
local community relationship, seeking better employees, and improving customer loyalty
(Du et al., 2010). Hence, CSR score satisfied both criteria. Thus, it is a valid instrumental
variable for female (board) ratio in Equation (5).
Does Board Gender Diversity Leads to Improved CSR?
Thus far, we conjecture that the lower idiosyncratic risk for firms with more female
directors is linked to firm’s better CSR score. However, it is not clear if such a connection
is coincidental or there is a fundamental causal relationship. This is the subject for
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investigation in this section.
Corporate reputation is one of the central issues in corporate governance and man-
agement because of it’s huge impact on firm’s value. Until recently, the main focus of
corporate reputation research has been on brand, with the most prominent textbook ex-
ample being the branding strategy of Coca Cola. Some studies link reputation to user
experience (Bontis et al., 2007) and media visibility (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). More
recent studies, however, note that brand value is also driven by firm’s CSR performance
(Donker et al., 2008; Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006; Vanhamme and Grobben, 2009).
They argue that CSR, acting as a safety net, can reduce firms’ reputation damage. The
natural question that follows is if board gender diversity is related to firm’s CSR per-
formance. Bear et al. (2010) study 51 healthcare firms from the Fortune’s 2009 survey
and find board gender diversity can indeed improve the firm’s technology strength (KLD
ESG: PRO+GOV+EMP) and institutional strength (KLD ESG: COM+DIV). Extend-
ing these previous studies, our paper provides more comprehensive analyses by testing
if more female board members can increase firm’s overall CSR performance, as well as
specific CSR subcategories. Hence, our third hypothesis is:
H3: Board gender diversity improves CSR overall performance, as well as each of the
seven CSR subcategories.
Here we narrow our female ratio to female board ratio, FemaleBdRatio, i.e. the ratio
of the number of female directors to board size. To test hypothesis H3, we perform a set
of first-difference regressions as follows:
∆CSRi,t = c+ β1 ∆Controli,t + γ1 ∆FemaleBdRatioi,t−1 + eCSRi,t (6)
∆FemaleBdRatioi,t+1 = c+ β2 ∆Controli,t + γ2 ∆CSRi,t + e
FBR
i,t (7)
where ∆ is the yearly difference; Control is a vector of control variables, including the
logarithmic of market capitalization, board size, ROA, leverage, sales, and dividend;
∆FemaleBdRatioi,t−1 is the change in female board ratio in the previous year; and CSR
is the KLD ESG score. We use the overall score (ALL), and seven subcategory scores
viz. Environment (ENV), Community (COM), Human Rights (HUM), Employee (EMP),
Diversity (DIV), Product (PRO), and Governance (GOV). In both Equations (6) and (7),
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we include sector and year dummies to control for sector and time fixed effects.
The structure of the set of regressions is designed to test the reverse causality between
board gender diversity and CSR. Sila et al. (2016) argue that gender diversity does not
affect board’s risk-taking, but it is the firm’s level of risk-taking that affects the choice of
director’s gender. Following the same argument, it is plausible that a firm that has a good
CSR record will go on to appoint more female directors. We use this set of regressions
to test both explanations. Under hypothesis H3, we expect to have significant γ1 and
insignificant γ2 coefficients. If the reverse causality is true then γ2 will also be statistically
significant.
So far, we have been using the net KLD ESG scores, i.e. the difference between the
corresponding scores for strengths and concerns (see MSCI ESG Research, 2015). Some
studies find KLD ESG strength and concern scores produce very different impact, and
recommend that “researchers needed to separately utilize the strength’s and concern’s
ratings” (Bear et al., 2010). Mattingly and Berman (2006) also suggest that the KLD
ESG strength and concern ratings can be classified into four types: institutional strength,
technical strength, institutional weakness, and technical weakness. For example, diversity
strength is linked to institutional strength (i.e. the stakeholders normative expectation),
and diversity concern is linked to technical weakness (i.e. the capability of firm resource
exchange).18 Following these two studies, we test if female board members affect strengths
and concerns differently. Specifically, we hypothesize that a gender diverse board improves
strength and reduces concern:
H3a: Board gender diversity improves overall CSR strength and the seven CSR sub-
categories. and
H3b: Board gender diversity reduces overall CSR concern and its seven CSR subcate-
gories.
We note that the calculation of KLD ESG scores on strength or concern are categorical
and non-negative. Hence, a Poisson regression is used instead of the OLS regression for
testing H3a and H3b. The Poisson regression is also ideal for capturing any non-linear
impact of female board ratio on KLD strength (or concern). The regression specification
18See Table 3 in Mattingly and Berman (2006) for detailed explanations of the classification and
components.
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is expressed as follows:




where yi,t is the KLD ESG strength (or concern) with the expected rate of occurrence λ,
a latent variable which in turns is determined by:
log λi,t = c+ β1 yi,t−1 + β2 ∆Controli,t + γ ∆FemaleBdRatioi,t−1 + ei,t, (9)
where yi,t−1 is the firm’s strength (or concern) in the previous year; ∆ is the yearly
difference; Control is a vector of control variables, which include the logarithmic of market
capitalization, board size, ROA, leverage, sales, and dividend; ∆FemaleBdRatioi,t−1 is
the change in female board ratio in the previous year.
RESULTS
Backtesting Portfolio Performance
Table 4 reports the means, in basis point, and the standard deviations of monthly portfolio
excess return and monthly Carhart risk factors. The market risk premium (Rm-Rf) and
size premium (SMB) are fairly stable in the two sub-periods. The growth premium (HML)
and the momentum factor (MOM) are highly positive in the first sub-period and highly
negative in the second sub-period possibly due to the subprime crisis. All portfolios have
positive excess returns over the full and two sub-sample periods. All five gender diverse
portfolios have similar excess return, with WIL having the highest excess return (66.66
bp) and MSParity having the lowest (59.08 bp). HE produces the highest excess return
(78.94 bp), and highest standard deviation (517.39 bp) compared with the five gender
diverse portfolios.
Portfolios performance is very different in the two sub-sample periods in Table 4. All
gender diverse portfolios perform better in the second sub-sample period (i.e. with a
much higher excess returns). The reverse is true for HE which was badly affected by the
2008 subprime crisis.
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Table 5 reports the results of excess return regression using the Carhart four-factor
model. For the full sample period, all portfolios have positive but statistically insignificant
alphas. When separated into sub-periods, HE is the only portfolio to have a negative
alpha in the second sub-period, but none of the alphas is statistically different from zero
for all portfolios. The magnitudes and signs of the factor loading suggest that all five
gender diverse portfolios are defensive (with market beta less than 1), larger size firms
(with negative loading on SMB), and value stocks (with positive loading on HML). The
reverse is true for HE.
Our backtest results above show that all portfolios, gender diverse or not, do not
produce significant alphas; hence, hypothesis H1 is rejected. Next, we test if there
exists different return and risk characteristics between portfolios (H1a and H1b), and
the results are reported in Table 6. Panel A of Table 6 shows there is no statistically
significant difference in risk-adjusted excess return among all portfolios. The results here
support the argument, e.g. Carter et al. (2010), that gender diversity does not have
immediate impact on firm performance. Our finding of zero alpha is consistent with the
theory of an efficient stock market.
Table 6, Panel B shows the risk comparison between portfolios. The first row of Panel
B shows that HE’s idiosyncratic risk is higher than all five gender diverse portfolios.
Specifically, the idiosyncratic volatility of HE is 1.43 (HE vs. WIL) to 2.48 (HE vs.
US2020) times higher than those of the gender diverse portfolios. All the variance test
ratio is significance at the 1% level, except the HE-WIL pair where it is significant at
the 5% level. The results in Table 6 indicate that the stock market’s reaction to gender
diversity is reflected in reduction in risk, instead of a higher return. This new finding
contributes to corporate gender diversity research and extends the findings in Adams and
Ferreira (2009) and Chapple and Humphrey (2014).
Among the gender diverse portfolios, SHE, WOB, MSParity, and WIL, there is no
significant difference in return and risk. Only US2020 is less risky than the other four
gender diverse portfolios at the 5% level.
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Firm Level Analyses
Table 7 reports the results for Fama-MacBeth regression of board gender diversity on
firm’s idiosyncratic volatility. The first two columns use female ratio which includes
both board and senior management; the last two columns use board female ratio. All
βSMB is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that small firms are likely to have higher
idiosyncratic volatility. Consistent with our findings from the portfolio analyses in the
previous section, FemaleRatiot−1 has a negative impact on idiosyncratic risk; the factor
loading is -0.101 and -0.120, respectively, for female ratio and female board ratio, and
both are significant at the 1% level. From the firm’s perspective, a firm is an undiversified
single-stock portfolio. Therefore, it is important for firm to reduce its idiosyncratic risk.
Furthermore, Table 7 shows positive loadings on the quadratic term, FemaleRatio2t−1
(0.757 and 0.560, respectively, for female ratio and female board ratio both significant
at the 1% level), suggesting a non-linear relationship between firm’s idiosyncratic risk
and board gender diversity. Together with the negative loadings on FemaleRatiot−1, the
results suggest the relationship between female leadership and idiosyncratic risk to be of
a U-shape pattern: gender diversity can reduce firm risk; but it has an adverse impact
on firm’s idiosyncratic risk if the female ratio is too high.
Next, we take the loadings on FemaleRatiot−1 and FemaleRatio2t−1 from the female
board ratio model (last column in Table 7) to calculate the impact of board gender
diversity on IdioV olt. For example, everything else equal, a female board ratio of 5%
will reduce idiosyncratic risk by 0.013 (i.e. −0.292 × 5% + 0.560 × 5%2). Similarly, a
female board ratio of 25% will reduce idiosyncratic risk by 0.038 (i.e. −0.292 × 25% +
0.560×25%2). However, the firm’s idiosyncratic risk starts to increase if the female board
ratio is larger than 30%. For example, a firm with 45% of female board ratio reduces
idiosyncratic risk by 0.018 (i.e. −0.292 × 45% + 0.560 × 45%2) which is not as much as
when the female board ratio is 25%. Figure 3i plots this relationship and shows clearly
the nonlinear relationship between idiosyncratic risk and female board ratio with 30%
being the optimal female board ratio. Similarly, Figure 3ii presents the impact of the
number of female board members on IdioV olt given the average board size of 10. Figure
3ii shows that only three female directors has the greatest reduction in idiosyncratic risk,19







consistent with the critical mass literature, e.g. 30% female board ratio in Joecks et al.
(2013) and three female board members in Torchia et al. (2011).
CSR Channel Results
Table 8 reports the results for our CSR channel hypothesis. We find that the loadings
for FemaleRatio∗, using the KLD ESG scores as instrumental variables, are all negative.
With female ratio, the loadings are -0.731 and -0.448, respectively, for ALL and DIV.
Using female board ratio, the loadings are -0.742 and -0.482, respectively, for ALL and
DIV. All four coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The statistical significance and
the conclusion do not change when the control variables are removed from Equation (4).
These results provide strong evidence that stock market investors in gender-diverse firm
are less price sensitive (and hence their shares have less idiosyncratic risk) as such firms
provide CSR insurance-like downside protection.
Board Gender Diversity and CSR
Table 9 reports the results for first-difference regression in Equation (6). Supporting the
hypothesis H3, γ1 (1.071) for FemaleBdRatio is significant at the 1% level suggesting
that a higher female board ratio is followed by improved firm’s overall CSR performance.
Interestingly, when we perform the same analysis on KLD ESG subcategory scores, we
find that γ1 is significant only for DIV and GOV (0.283 for DIV at the 10% level and 0.397
for GOV at the 1% level). These findings suggest that female directors have a greater
impact on workforce gender diversity and on corporate governance.20 Our findings for
CSR improvement in corporate governance is consistent with the findings in Adams and
Ferreira (2009), where the authors note that female board members are more likely to
join corporate governance panels. Table 10 reports the other set of the first-difference
regression. The γ2 loadings for ALL, DIV, and GOV ESG scores are statistically insignif-
icant suggesting that there is no reverse causality; firms with better CSR scores do not
go on to appoint more female directors.21
20We have removed all the board gender diversity scores from all ESG scores to avoid spurious results.
21We find some weak significance that the loadings on environmental and communication affect the
female board ratio.
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To detect if there exists a non-linear impact from female board members on KLD
ESG scores, we repeat Equation (6) and include additional quadratic term of female
board ratio (FemaleBdRatio2t−1). The results (not reported here) do not support any
nonlinear relationship. The loading on FemaleBdRatio2 is -3.229 [t-stat: 1.65] for ALL,
-0.358 [t-stat: 0.47] for DIV, and -0.406 [t-stat: 0.56] for GOV.
Table 11 reports the Poisson regression results separately for firm’s CSR strength
and concern ratings for each sub-category and their aggregate. At the aggregate level
(ALL), the loading on strength is insignificant, while the loading on concern is -0.340,
significant at the 1% level. This means that one standard deviation increase in female
board ratio leads to 3.34% (∆λ = e0− e−0.340×0.10) reduction in concern at the aggregate
level. This finding is consistent with Mattingly and Berman (2006) who find the female
board members’ influence on firm’s CSR performance is partial.
Next, we look at the sub-category ratings, the impact on concern at the aggregate
level is mainly driven by DIV and GOV (-1.723 for DIV, significant at the 1% level;
-0.513 for GOV, significant at the 10% level). This means that one standard deviation
increase in female board ratio leads to 15.82% (∆λ = e0 − e−1.723×0.10) reduction in the
DIV concern rating and 5.00% (∆λ = e0 − e−0.513×0.10) reduction in the GOV concern
rating. The impact is much stronger on gender diversity than on corporate governance.
As for category strength ratings, we find some significant impact on community and
employee relationship categories (0.879 for COM, significant at the 1% level; 0.519 for
EMP, significant at 10% level).
As a robustness test, we run first-difference regression for strength and concern, con-
trolling for sector and year fixed effects. We find the results (not reported here) are
largely the same, except that the loading for COM strength becomes insignificant. The
loadings for ALL, COM, and EMP strength ratings are 0.360 [t-stat: 1.20], 0.043 [t-stat:
0.56], and 0.353 [t-stat: 2.21]. The loadings for ALL, DIV, and GOV concern ratings are
-0.711 [t-stat: 2.93], -0.446 [t-stat: 4.57], and -0.324 [t-stat: 2.85]. Our findings is slightly
different from Bear et al. (2010), where the authors argue that board diversity improves
both technology strength (PRO+GOV+EMP) and institutional strength (COM+DIV).
However, when we include a larger sample size and a longer sample period than Bear
et al. (2010), we find strength improvements only for EMP and DIV.
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Interestingly, Kumar et al. (2016) argues that “... strengths in CSP [corporate social
performance] related to primary stakeholder domains are associated with superior corpo-
rate performance. ... weaknesses [concerns] in CSP, the results suggest that if a firm
performs poorly in meeting the expectations of one or more stakeholders it is penalized
in the form of poor performance.” Our findings here suggest female directors help to
prevent concerns and corporate poor performance, instead of improving strengths lead-
ing to superior corporate performance. This seems to be consistent with our portfolio
analyses whereby gender diverse portfolios present themselves as being less risky, instead
of generating superior return.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Contribution
Our research contributes to a better understanding of the rationale for investing in firms
that embrace gender diversity. In particular, we provide comprehensive analyses of the
risk-return profiles of five market traded gender diverse equity portfolios. Our findings are
consistent with several previous studies where no abnormal return was found (Austrian
market: Chapple and Humphrey; UK market: Gregory-Smith et al.). Furthermore, we
find strong evidence that gender diverse portfolios have less residual risks. We argue that
this is because investors of (board) gender diverse firms are less price sensitive. We link
this finding to firm’s better CSR performance and insurance-like downside protection.
Our research on gender diverse firms is important for the recent trend of socially re-
sponsible investors, who incorporate firm’s environmental, social, and governance aspects
into their investment criteria. Ioannou and Serafeim (2015) note that, nowadays, firms
with high CSR score are more likely to receive positive recommendation from experience
or large brokerage house analysts; in the early 1990’s, analysts used to have pessimistic
viewpoints for these firms. Given the strong association between female directors and re-
duced concerns in corporate diversity and corporate governance, we argue that these gen-
der diverse equity portfolios form an important new asset class widening the investment
choice for the increasingly important SRI (Socially Responsible Investment) community.
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Conclusion
Using the top 1,000 US stocks from 2002 to 2015 as the tradable asset universe, we
replicate and backtest the portfolio performance of five market traded gender diverse
stock portfolios, viz. SSGA’s SHE, Barclay’s WIL (Women In Leadership), MSCI’s WOB
Index (Women on Board), Morgan Stanley’s Parity Portfolio (MSParity), and US2020
(Sonnabend, 2015). Using the Carhart four-factor model, we find that, in comparison
to the male dominated counterpart, gender diverse portfolios perform equally well, on a
risk-adjusted basis, and have less idiosyncratic risks. Our research findings unanimously
indicates a smaller investment risk in these gender diverse portfolios. Additional results
from panel regressions suggest that these findings are also robust at the firm specific level.
To understand further the gender-CSR-risk relationship, we use CSR as an instru-
mental variable for board gender diversity, and find a statistically significant association
between high CSR performance and reduced idiosyncratic risk, suggesting that gender
effect on stock riskiness is through the CSR channel.
Further empirical analyses confirm that, despite smaller presence than men, female
leadership helps to improve corporate social responsibility performance. We have ruled
out the reverse causality, i.e. there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that firms
with good CSR performance will go on to hire more women executives. We have carefully
adjusted the KLD diversity score for board diversity to avoid any spurious results.
Limitation and Future Research
Due to the restriction on stock liquidity and data quality, market-traded gender based
portfolios tend to be composed of stocks from large market capitalization firms. The
exchange traded fund, SHE, marketed by State Street Global Advisors has the largest
top 1,000 US market capitalization firms as the investment universe, which we adopt as
our sample universe. Therefore, our results are confined to large US firms and our findings
are strictly related to investment and capital market asset pricing only. Gender diverse
portfolios may have different characteristics if the stock universe is from a different region
or country and includes small firm stocks. Such gender diversity research in future could
also consider a global universe since there are mutual funds that cover global equity and
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gender diversity (e.g. Pax Ellevate Golbal Women’s Index. Ticker: PXWIX); this area
of research has not yet been explored.
Another limitation of our study is the choice of MSCI KLD Corporate CSR (Cor-
porate Social Responsibility) indicators. There are other agencies (e.g. Sustainalytics,
Bloomberg, Asset4, FTSE4good, RepRisk etc) that provide similar CSR (or ESG; Envi-
ronment, Social and Governance) scores. The CSR performance measures and assessment
criteria of different agencies are different from one another. While MSCI KLD indicators
are well established and widely used especially among the academic research community,
our findings here may change had we used a different set of CSR performance measures
from another agency.
Finally, the TSLS regression is normally used for addressing endogeneity. Here, we use
CSR as an instrumental variable for female board ratio for testing the connection between
female board ratio and idiosyncratic volatility. Here, we extend further and argue that
CSR is a channel to which female directors’ actions reduce firms’ idiosyncratic risk.
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Table 1: Corporate Board Descriptive Statistics for Gender Portfolios
This table reports the average board size and average female board ratio for
various gender diverse portfolios, viz. SHE, WOB, US2020, MSParity,
WIL, and HE. SHE mimics SSGA’s ETF with ticker SHE, HE is cre-
ated here to contrast SHE. WOB mimics MSCI Women On Board Index,
US2020 is a campaign led by Sonnabend (2015), MSParity mimics Morgan
Stanley Parity Portfolio and WIL mimics Barclays Women In Leadership
ETN. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. N is the total number of firm
years.
Board Female Female
Size Board Size Board Ratio N
Full Sample 9.47 1.19 0.12 20,921
(2.67) (1.05) (0.10)
SHE 10.34 2.82 0.27 1,131
(2.31) (1.15) (0.10)
WOB 11.84 3.29 0.28 1,880
(2.40) (0.74) (0.07)
US2020 10.32 2.67 0.26 3,409
(2.15) (0.87 (0.06)
MSParity 12.02 3.38 0.29 1,760
(2.43) (0.68) (0.07)
WIL 10.35 3.00 0.29 1,931
(2.33) (0.98) (0.07)
HE 8.82 0.24 0.02 3,473
(2.58) (0.45) (0.04)
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Table 2: Corporate Social Responsibility Mean Scores
This table reports the mean and standard deviations (Std) of the CSR scores
for all firms in our tradable US stock universe over the full sample period of
2002 to 2015 and two sub-periods. There are 1,951 firms in total. N is the
total number of firm years. “Overall Score” is Strength minus Concern. N is
the total number of firm years.
2002 – 2015 2002 – 2007 2008 – 2015
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Panel A: Strength
Combined 2.02 2.83 1.61 2.25 2.41 3.24
Environment 0.35 0.82 0.15 0.48 0.55 1.00
Community 0.23 0.59 0.21 0.58 0.26 0.60
Human Rights 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.22
Employee 0.50 0.98 0.35 0.67 0.65 1.19
Diversity 0.76 1.20 0.80 1.20 0.71 1.20
Product 0.11 0.34 0.07 0.28 0.15 0.38
Governance 0.14 0.38 0.13 0.35 0.15 0.40
Panel B: Concern
Combined 2.12 2.16 2.22 2.17 2.04 2.16
Environment 0.30 0.76 0.31 0.79 0.29 0.74
Community 0.11 0.33 0.12 0.36 0.09 0.31
Human Rights 0.07 0.28 0.09 0.31 0.05 0.24
Employee 0.45 0.71 0.50 0.70 0.41 0.71
Diversity 0.44 0.61 0.32 0.49 0.56 0.68
Product 0.33 0.68 0.35 0.69 0.31 0.66
Governance 0.52 0.64 0.53 0.64 0.50 0.65
Panel C: Overall Score
Combined -0.11 2.84 -0.50 2.42 0.38 3.17
Environment 0.05 0.94 -0.16 0.77 0.26 1.04
Community 0.13 0.62 0.09 0.62 0.17 0.61
Human Rights -0.05 0.30 -0.08 0.31 -0.01 0.30
Employee 0.05 1.16 -0.14 0.92 0.24 1.33
Diversity 0.30 1.21 0.37 1.19 0.24 1.23
Product -0.22 0.72 -0.27 0.72 -0.17 0.71
Governance -0.38 0.74 -0.41 0.73 -0.35 0.76
N 14,335 7,023 7,312
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Table 3: Corporate Social Responsibility Sector Average
This table reports the mean and standard deviations (Std) of the KLD ALL
scores by sectors in our tradable US stock universe over the full sample period
of 2002 to 2015. N is the total number of firm years.
Mean Std N
Consumer Discretionary -0.30 2.68 2,328
Consumer Staples 0.39 4.29 686
Energy -1.34 2.64 1,068
Financials 0.13 2.30 2,882
Health Care 0.03 2.50 1,617
Industrials -0.46 2.53 1,796
Information Technology 0.76 3.08 2,233
Materials -0.81 3.07 912
Telecommunication Services 0.09 2.08 152
Utilities -0.35 3.26 661
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Table 4: Average Monthly Returns for Carhart Factors and Gender Portfolios
This table reports the mean and standard deviation (Std) of monthly returns
in basis points on Carhart four factors and the various gender diverse stock
portfolios over the sample period of 2002 to 2015 and two sub-periods. Port-
folio returns are compiled using monthly stock returns, Rm−Rf is the mar-
ket risk premium, SML is small-minus-large, HML is high-minus-low, and
MOM is momentum. SHE mimics SSGA’s ETF with ticker SHE, HE is
created here to contrast SHE, WOB mimics MSCI Women On Board Index,
US2020 is a campaign led by Sonnabend (2015), MSParity mimics Morgan
Stanley Parity Portfolio and WIL mimics Barclays Women In Leadership
ETN. N is the number of monthly observations.
2002 – 2015 2002 – 2007 2008 – 2015
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Panel A: Carhart Factors
Rm-Rf 64.39 429.76 64.50 336.58 64.31 485.28
SMB 17.88 232.34 18.39 234.44 17.53 232.11
HML -0.63 242.94 19.38 176.71 -14.39 279.62
MOM 5.60 488.81 19.89 400.39 -4.22 543.14
Panel B: Gender-based Portfolios
SHE 60.47 424.84 58.41 327.75 68.40 480.34
WOB 59.92 407.54 50.63 305.64 70.06 467.33
US2020 66.31 414.81 57.76 318.48 76.67 471.75
MSParity 59.08 404.29 49.74 298.53 69.08 465.80
WIL 66.66 438.04 53.24 335.40 81.28 497.81
HE 78.94 517.39 99.21 396.25 73.83 584.70
N 162 66 96
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Table 5: Excess Return Factor Regression
This table reports the regression of the gender diverse portfolio monthly excess
returns against Carhart four factors. The sample period is from 2002 to 2015.
Rm−Rf is the market risk premium, SMB is small-minus-big, HML is high-
minus-low, and MOM is momentum. SHE mimics SSGA’s ETF with ticker
SHE, HE is created here to contrast SHE, WOB mimics MSCI Women On
Board Index, US2020 is a campaign led by Sonnabend (2015), MSParity
mimics Morgan Stanley Parity Portfolio and WIL mimics Barclays Women
In Leadership ETN. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in [ ].
SHE WOB US2020 MSParity WIL HE
Panel A: 2002 – 2015 (N = 162)
Alpha 0.031% 0.075% 0.102% 0.076% 0.084% 0.052%
[0.35] [0.84] [1.40] [0.87] [0.88] [0.45]
Rm-Rf 0.963 0.897 0.926 0.886 0.945 1.112
[39.21] [37.56] [46.99] [37.40] [36.42] [35.84]
SMB -0.244 -0.272 -0.170 -0.289 -0.118 0.143
[5.87] [6.73] [5.10] [7.20] [2.70] [2.71]
HML 0.047 0.158 0.072 0.177 0.107 -0.215
[1.19] [4.12] [2.29] [4.66] [2.56] [4.32]
MOM -0.045 -0.060 -0.066 -0.062 -0.077 -0.091
[2.18] [2.97] [3.99] [3.11] [3.53] [3.47]
Adj. R-sqr 0.928 0.926 0.952 0.926 0.925 0.923
Panel B: 2002 – 2007 (N = 66)
Alpha 0.005% 0.019% 0.048% 0.018% 0.003% 0.247%
[0.03] [0.15] [0.43] [0.15] [0.02] [1.76]
Rm-Rf 0.978 0.871 0.903 0.853 0.932 1.113
[18.35] [18.66] [21.76] [18.55] [17.33] [21.51]
SMB -0.285 -0.340 -0.188 -0.365 -0.162 0.133
[4.20] [5.73] [3.55] [6.25] [2.37] [2.02]
HML 0.006 0.024 -0.013 0.068 -0.158 -0.027
[0.08] [0.35] [0.20] [0.99] [1.94] [0.35]
MOM 0.000 -0.084 -0.080 -0.084 -0.058 0.038
[0.00] [2.33] [2.51] [2.38] [1.39] [0.95]
Adj. R-sqr 0.881 0.895 0.923 0.893 0.884 0.923
Panel C: 2008 – 2015 (N = 96)
Alpha 0.044% 0.155% 0.166% 0.153% 0.198% -0.165%
[0.37] [1.30] [1.71] [1.30] [1.64] [1.09]
Rm-Rf 0.960 0.894 0.926 0.887 0.935 1.140
[33.66] [31.66] [40.25] [31.50] [32.54] [31.52]
SMB -0.222 -0.211 -0.149 -0.221 -0.080 0.128
[4.07] [3.91] [3.38] [4.10] [1.45] [1.84]
HML 0.044 0.215 0.107 0.221 0.198 -0.367
[0.89] [4.42] [2.71] [4.56] [4.01] [5.91]
MOM -0.059 -0.036 -0.053 -0.042 -0.061 -0.170
[2.33] [1.45] [2.60] [1.69] [2.39] [5.30]
Adj. R-sqr 0.942 0.940 0.961 0.940 0.945 0.938
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Table 6: Portfolios’ Alphas and Idiosyncratic Risk Comparison
This table reports the tests for difference in alphas (α1 − α2; in percentage
points) and in idiosyncratic risks (s21/s
2
2) for the gender diverse portfolios. The
sample period is from 2002 to 2015. SHE mimics SSGA’s ETF with ticker
SHE, HE is created here to contrast SHE, WOB mimics MSCI Women on
Board Index, US2020 is a campaign led by Sonnabend (2015), MSParity
mimics Morgan Stanley Parity Portfolio and WIL mimics Barclays Women
In Leadership ETN.
Panel A: Paired Student’s t-test (H0 : α1=row − α2=column = 0)
SHE WOB MSParity US2020 WIL
HE 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03
(p-value) (0.90) (0.89) (0.88) (0.75) (0.84)
SHE -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05
(0.62) (0.60) (0.40) (0.55)











SHE WOB MSParity US2020 WIL
HE 1.60 1.69 1.72 2.48 1.43
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
SHE 1.06 1.07 1.55 0.90
(0.73) (0.65) (0.01) (0.48)







Table 7: Firm’s Idiosyncratic Risk and Female Leadership Ratio
This table reports results for the Fama-MacBeth regression. The sample
period is from 2002 to 2015. Every year, we first run individual Carhart
four factor model to obtain firm-specific idiosyncratic volatility (εi,t) for firm
i in year t. The individual firm’s idiosyncratic volatility is calculated by
IdioV oli,t =
√
12 × Std(εi,t). βMktRf is the coefficient of market premium,
βSMB is the coefficient of size premium, βHML is the coefficient of firm prospec-
tive premium, and βMOM is the coefficient of momentum. We consider two
versions of FemaleRatio: the first one is the ratio of female board members
to total board members; the other one is the ratio of female board mem-
bers and senior managers to total board members and senior managers. The
corresponding t-statistics are reported in [ ].
Dep. Variable: Idiosyncratic Volatility
Board & senior mgt Board only
Constant 0.206 0.215 0.209 0.216
[22.80] [25.04] [22.47] [23.40]
βMktRf 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
[1.38] [1.37] [1.38] [1.37]
βSMB 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.018
[8.21] [8.15] [8.22] [8.13]
βHML 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
[1.31] [1.32] [1.31] [1.32]
βMOM -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
[1.33] [1.35] [1.34] [1.34]
Female Ratio (t-1) -0.101 -0.325 -0.120 -0.292
[6.80] [14.31] [11.34] [13.61]
Female Ratio2 (t-1) 0.757 0.560
[9.94] [6.12]
Avg. R-sqr 0.237 0.243 0.239 0.243
N 18,197
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Table 8: Firm’s Idiosyncratic Risk and Corporate Social Responsibility Score
This table reports the results for two-stage least square regression. The
sample period is from 2002 to 2015. The dependent variable is the annu-
alized standard deviation of the residuals from Carhart four factor Model
(IdioV oli,t =
√
12 × Std(εi,t)). We use two instrumental variables to proxy
female ratios: the first one is KLD ESG ALL score, and the second one is the
the KLD ESG DIV score (both are adjusted by removing board diversity in-
dicators), controlling for firm characteristics which include the logarithmic of
firm’s market capitalization, board size, ROA, leverage, sales, and dividend.
βMktRf is the coefficient of market premium, βSMB is the coefficient of size
premium, βHML is the coefficient of firm prospective premium, and βMOM is
the coefficient of momentum. We consider two different FemaleRatio: the
first one is the ratio of female board members to total board members; the
other one is the ratio of female board members and senior managers to to-
tal board members and senior managers. The corresponding t-statistics are
reported in [ ].
Dep. Variable: Idiosyncratic Volatility
Board & senior mgt Board only
Constant 0.321 0.283 0.323 0.288
[35.38] [37.57] [37.90] [39.43]
βMktRf 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
[6.19] [6.78] [6.12] [6.70]
βSMB 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
[13.75] [14.81] [13.41] [14.53]
βHML 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
[6.50] [6.68] [6.69] [6.82]
βMOM -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
[0.96] [0.63] [1.14] [0.79]
IV: ALL (t-1) -0.731 -0.742
[14.84] [17.20]
IV: DIV (t-1) -0.448 -0.482
[12.81] [15.14]
Adj. R-sqr 0.043 0.138 0.035 0.131
N 13,689
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Table 9: First Difference Regression of KLD ESG Score on Female Board Ratio
This table reports the regression results, with fixed sector and year effect. The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. ∆ is the
yearly difference.FemaleBdRatioi,t−1 is the lagged female board ratio. The dependent variables are the KLD ESG scores, viz.
Environment (ENV), Community (COM), Human Rights (HUM), Employee (EMP), Diversity (DIV), Product (PRO), and
Governance (GOV). ALL is the sum of all KLD ESG sub category scores. The corresponding t-statistics are reported in [ ].
Dep. Variable: ∆KLD ESG Score
ALL ENV COM HUM EMP DIV PRO GOV
Constant -0.346 -0.067 0.014 -0.020 -0.063 0.024 -0.031 -0.204
[5.33] [2.85] [0.92] [2.39] [1.96] [0.96] [1.73] [8.40]
∆LN(MarketCap) -0.119 -0.033 -0.049 -0.017 0.036 -0.036 0.001 -0.020
[2.63] [2.01] [4.62] [3.01] [1.61] [2.04] [0.09] [1.18]
∆BoardSize 0.007 -0.011 0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.014 -0.001 0.005
[0.46] [2.01] [0.81] [0.74] [0.58] [2.40] [0.24] [0.83]
∆ROA 0.000 -0.122 0.016 -0.051 0.061 0.006 0.010 0.080
[0.00] [2.06] [0.41] [2.43] [0.76] [0.09] [0.23] [1.31]
∆Leverage -0.348 0.034 -0.021 -0.025 -0.092 0.009 -0.083 -0.170
[1.79] [0.49] [0.46] [1.02] [0.95] [0.12] [1.56] [2.34]
∆Sales 0.089 0.066 0.001 -0.006 -0.005 0.011 -0.023 0.044
[1.03] [2.11] [0.04] [0.50] [0.12] [0.33] [0.95] [1.36]
∆Dividend -0.042 0.009 0.002 0.007 -0.082 -0.009 -0.011 0.043
[0.13] [0.08] [0.02] [0.16] [0.52] [0.07] [0.13] [0.36]
∆FemaleBdRatio (t-1) 1.071 0.060 0.095 0.009 0.324 0.283 -0.097 0.397
[2.80] [0.44] [1.05] [0.17] [1.71] [1.90] [0.93] [2.78]
Adj. R-sqr 0.077 0.147 0.027 0.018 0.084 0.029 0.025 0.176
N 11,177
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Table 10: First Difference Regression of Female Board Ratio on KLD ESG Scores
This table reports the regression results, with fixed sector and year effect.
The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. ∆ is the yearly difference. Scores
are the KLD ESG scores, viz. Environment (ENV), Community (COM),
Human Rights (HUM), Employee (EMP), Diversity (DIV), Product (PRO),
and Governance (GOV). ALL is the sum of all KLD ESG sub category
scores. The dependent variable is the female board ratio in the next year
(FemaleBdRatioi,t+1). The corresponding t-statistics are reported in [ ].
Dep. Variable: ∆Female Board Ratio (t+1)
ALL ENV COM HUM EMP DIV PRO GOV
Constant 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
[4.87] [4.85] [4.85] [4.85] [4.82] [4.87] [4.83] [4.85]
∆LN(MarketCap)0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[1.24] [1.27] [1.30] [1.23] [1.23] [1.21] [1.23] [1.23]
∆BoardSize -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[2.27] [2.24] [2.28] [2.27] [2.27] [2.25] [2.27] [2.27]
∆ROA 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
[2.77] [2.81] [2.76] [2.77] [2.77] [2.77] [2.77] [2.77]
∆Leverage 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
[2.32] [2.30] [2.32] [2.31] [2.31] [2.31] [2.30] [2.32]
∆Sales 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
[1.68] [1.65] [1.69] [1.69] [1.69] [1.69] [1.68] [1.68]
∆Dividend 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
[0.80] [0.80] [0.80] [0.80] [0.80] [0.80] [0.80] [0.80]
∆Score 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
[0.70] [1.91] [1.85] [0.23] [0.23] [0.85] [0.61] [0.44]
Adj. R-sqr 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
N 11,924
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Table 11: Poisson Regression of Strength and Concern against Female Board Ratio
This table reports the results for Poisson regression in terms of KLD ESG
strength and concern ratings. The sample period is from 2002 to 2015. The
dependent variable of the Poisson regression is the strength or concern ratings
in KLD ALL and its seven categories, viz. environment (ENV), communica-
tion (COM), human rights (HUM), employee (EMP), diversity (DIV), prod-
uct (PRO), and corporate governance (GOV). We only report the loadings
on FemaleBdRatiot−1; other control variables are not reported to conserve
space. The control variables include the lagged dependent variable (yi,t−1),
the logarithmic of firm’s market capitalization, board size, ROA, leverage,



















Figure 1: Average Female Board Ratio as of April 2015
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Figure 2: SHE and HE Female Board Ratio
(i) Female Board Ratio (ii) Female Board Member
Figure 3: Non-linear Relationship between Idiosyncratic Risk and Female Board Ratio
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